Revealed cardinal preference

I prove that as long as we allow the marginal utility for money (lambda) to vary between purchases (similarly to the budget) then the quasi-linear and the ordinal budget-constrained models rationalize the same data. However, we know that lambda is approximately constant. I provide a simple constructive proof for the necessary and sufficient condition for the constant lambda rationalization, which I argue should replace the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference in empirical studies of consumer behavior. 'Go Cardinals!' It is the minimal requirement of any scientifi c theory that it is consistent with the data it is trying to explain. In the case of (Hicksian) consumer theory it was revealed preference -introduced by Samuelson (1938,1948) - that provided an empirical test to satisfy this need. At that time most of economic reasoning was done in terms of a competitive general equilibrium, a concept abstract enough so that it can be built on the ordinal preferences over baskets of goods - even if the extremely specialized ones of Arrow and Debreu. However, starting in the sixties, economics has moved beyond the 'invisible hand' explanation of how -even competitive- markets operate. A seemingly unavoidable step of this 'revolution' was that ever since, most economic research has been carried out in a partial equilibrium context. Now, the partial equilibrium approach does not mean that the rest of the markets are ignored, rather that they are held constant. In other words, there is a special commodity -call it money - that reflects the trade-offs of moving purchasing power across markets. As a result, the basic building block of consumer behavior in partial equilibrium is no longer the consumer's preferences over goods, rather her valuation of them, in terms of money. This new paradigm necessitates a new theory of revealed preference

The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem

In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the question of fairly aggregating the preferences of community members to determine an allocation of funds to projects. This problem is different from standard fair resource allocation because of public goods: The allocated goods benefit all users simultaneously. Fairness is crucial in participatory decision making, since generating equitable outcomes is an important goal of these processes. We argue that the classic game theoretic notion of core captures fairness in the setting. To compute the core, we first develop a novel characterization of a public goods market equilibrium called the Lindahl equilibrium, which is always a core solution. We then provide the first (to our knowledge) polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium for a broad set of utility functions; our algorithm also generalizes (in a non-trivial way) the well-known concept of proportional fairness. We use our theoretical insights to perform experiments on real participatory budgeting voting data. We empirically show that the core can be efficiently computed for utility functions that naturally model our practical setting, and examine the relation of the core with the familiar welfare objective. Finally, we address concerns of incentives and mechanism design by developing a randomized approximately dominant-strategy truthful mechanism building on the exponential mechanism from differential privacy

Mathematical utility theory and the representability of demand by continuous homogeneous functions

The resort to utility-theoretical issues will permit us to propose a constructive procedure for deriving a homogeneous of degree one continuous function that gives raise to a primitive demand function under suitably mild conditions. This constitutes the first self-contained and elementary proof of a necessary and sufficient condition for an integrability problem to have a solution by continuous (subjective utility) functions.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Revealed Preferences with Plural Motives: Axiomatic Foundations of Normative Assessments in Non-Utilitarian Welfare Economics

This paper explores the possibility of defining a non-utilitarian normative standard for assessments of welfare and deprivation. The paper formalises a key aspect of Amartya Sen’s critique of the assumption of consistent utility-maximisation in the revealed preference theory and proposes a generalisation of the standard Samuelsonian choice model for the case in which choices are based on plural motives (here, self-interested and moral motives). Based on a set of intuitive assumptions about the way in which unobservable motives are linked to observable choices, we then construct an alternative normative ranking rule that can be used in non-utilitarian welfare economics to rank social outcomes or provide a normative basis for the construction of composite indices, for instance

Measuring portfolio performance using a modified measure of risk

This paper reports the results of an investigation into the properties of a theoretical modification of beta proposed by Leland (1999) and based on earlier work of Rubinstein (1976). It is shown that when returns are elliptically symmetric, beta is the appropriate measure of risk and that there are other situations in which the modified beta will be similar to the traditional measure based on the capital asset pricing model. For the case where returns have a normal distribution, it is shown that the criterion either does not exist or reduces exactly to the conventional beta. It is therefore conjectured that the modified measure will only be useful for portfolios that have nonstandard return distributions which incorporate skewness. For such situations, it is shown how to estimate the measure using regression and how to compare the resulting statistic with a traditional estimated beta using Hotelling's test. An empirical study based on stocks from the FTSE350 does not find evidence to support the use of the new measure even in the presence of skewness.Journal of Asset Management (2007) 7, 388-403. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jam.225005

Socially optimal contribution rate and cap in a proportional (DC) pension system

In our model, the government operates a mandatory proportional (DC) pension system to substitute for the low life-cycle savings of the lower-paid myopic workers, while maintaining the incentives of the higher-paid far-sighted ones in contributing to the system. The introduction of an appropriate cap on pension contribution (or its base)—excluding the earnings above the cap from the contribution base—raises the optimal contribution rate, helping more the lower-paid myopic workers and reserving enough room for the saving of higher-paid far-sighted ones. The social welfare is almost independent of the cap in a relatively wide interval but the maximal welfare is higher than the capless welfare by 0.3–4.5 %.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Behavioral implications of shortlisting procedures

We consider two-stage “shortlisting procedures” in which the menu of alternatives is first pruned by some process or criterion and then a binary relation is maximized. Given a particular first-stage process, our main result supplies a necessary and sufficient condition for choice data to be consistent with a procedure in the designated class. This result applies to any class of procedures with a certain lattice structure, including the cases of “consideration filters,” “satisficing with salience effects,” and “rational shortlist methods.” The theory avoids background assumptions made for mathematical convenience; in this and other respects following Richter’s classical analysis of preference-maximizing choice in the absence of shortlisting

Social welfare and profit maximization from revealed preferences

Consider the seller's problem of finding optimal prices for her $n$ (divisible) goods when faced with a set of $m$ consumers, given that she can only observe their purchased bundles at posted prices, i.e., revealed preferences. We study both social welfare and profit maximization with revealed preferences. Although social welfare maximization is a seemingly non-convex optimization problem in prices, we show that (i) it can be reduced to a dual convex optimization problem in prices, and (ii) the revealed preferences can be interpreted as supergradients of the concave conjugate of valuation, with which subgradients of the dual function can be computed. We thereby obtain a simple subgradient-based algorithm for strongly concave valuations and convex cost, with query complexity $O(m^2/\epsilon^2)$, where $\epsilon$ is the additive difference between the social welfare induced by our algorithm and the optimum social welfare. We also study social welfare maximization under the online setting, specifically the random permutation model, where consumers arrive one-by-one in a random order. For the case where consumer valuations can be arbitrary continuous functions, we propose a price posting mechanism that achieves an expected social welfare up to an additive factor of $O(\sqrt{mn})$ from the maximum social welfare. Finally, for profit maximization (which may be non-convex in simple cases), we give nearly matching upper and lower bounds on the query complexity for separable valuations and cost (i.e., each good can be treated independently)